PARTICULAR EXAMPLES OF FEDERAL BICAMERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Abstract

Every form of bicameralism contains certain specific features, as it reflects the particular characteristics of a political community and the interests within it that need to be institutionally expressed. This paper examines distinctive examples of cooperative federal and consociational models (Germany and Belgium), which effectively reflect a higher level of constitutional complexity. However, the primary focus is placed on the constitutional solutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an atypical case. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to represent a state with significant potential for political conflict, while the constitutional balance conditioned by its complex ethnic structure is still faced with serious legal and political challenges. The aim of the paper is to point to the specificity and rationale of these solutions, as well as to deviations from, or differences in relation to, standard models. Balancing various interests, i.e. preventing majorization, in a state that has undergone both dissolution and aggregation and that possesses a greater conflict potential than other states, requires such a complex mechanism. Nevertheless, the necessary complexity of the mechanism must be accompanied by an appropriate political culture – a lasting commitment to achieving agreement among the constituent peoples.